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Sammendrag 
Er det slik at land med stor inntektsulikhet omfordeler mer enn land med mindre ulikhet? Dette er en 
svært mye diskutert sammenheng i litteraturen, men de mange internasjonale analysene som diskuterer 
dette temaet gir ikke noe klart svar på hvilken sammenheng som gjelder. I denne studien vises det til at 
ulike målemetoder i de forskjellige analysene bidrar til uklarheten. Blant annet er det anvendt ulike 
operasjonaliseringer av omfordeling. I denne studien foreslås det å anvende en metode for vurderinger 
av omfordeling i ulike land basert på etablering av en felles referanse for sammenlikninger. Det 
argumenteres for at denne metoden etablerer et sammenlikningsgrunnlag som identifiserer 
skattepolitikkens bidrag i landene. Videre hevdes det at dette omfordelingskonseptet er relevant for 
mange analyser av omfordeling i et internasjonalt perspektiv. Metodens fordeler og begrensninger 
diskuteres og dens anvendelse illustreres ved hjelp av mikrodata fra Luxembourg Income Study i 
kombinasjon med tall fra OECD for 15 land, Norge inkludert.     
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1. Introduction 
What is the relationship between income inequality and redistribution from a cross-country 
perspective? It depends – not least because observers have in mind different concepts of redistribution 
and apply different methods. We argue that the ambiguous results found in the literature may stem at 
least in part from the use of different definitions of redistribution, with regard to both the way that pre-
tax inequality is taken account of by the measure employed, and to which part of public policies (i.e., 
taxes or expenditure side characteristics of budgets) are analyzed, and that these ambiguities can be 
reduced by applying the “transplant-and-compare” approach, rendering fiscal regimes into a common 
base by adjusting for differences in pre-fisc (pre-tax/transfer) income inequality. The objective of the 
procedure is to make the comparator countries’ pre-fisc distributions as similar as possible in order to 
tease out the “pure” effect of tax-and-transfer policies (leaving out the effect which may be due to the 
fact that the starting points, namely pre-fisc distributions between the countries, differ). 
 
We illustrate both what is possible using this technique, and what remains problematic, by conducting 
an exploratory international comparison based on microdata from the Luxembourg Income Study 
database for 15 countries around the end of the last decade. 
 
Results are consistent with a conclusion that the relationship between countries’ common-base 
redistributional efforts for the personal income tax and their pre-tax income inequality levels is weaker 
than has been supposed in studies using standard measures of redistribution which do not correct for 
pre-tax inequality differences. Issues of significance, from both economic and statistical points of 
view, remain, and are discussed from a pragmatic point of view in the concluding section of the paper. 
 
The relationship between redistribution and original inequality is undefined from a theoretical 
standpoint, but the literature (briefly described in Section 2) offers simplified “stories” to two 
possibilities: the median voter hypothesis predicts that pre-fiscally more unequal countries redistribute 
more whereas the “Robin Hood paradox” is an often used characteristic and starting point of theories 
aiming at explaining the opposite (i.e., that they redistribute less). In Section 2, we also briefly review 
the different measures of redistribution typically used in empirical work. In Section 3, we discuss our 
data sources.   
 
A significant degree of ambiguity in empirical findings undoubtedly stems from the use of different 
measurement methodologies. In Section 4, by means of the transplant-and-compare procedure, which 
is designed to filter out influences stemming from or reflecting diverse original inequality experiences, 
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we lessen or remove these ambiguities. For example, we find that a “familiar” cross-country finding, 
that greater pre-fisc inequality goes with greater redistribution (as suggested by the median voter 
hypothesis), is considerably weakened when we use the transplant and compare procedure. 
 
An ever-present problem, of course, is that we do not have access to truly original, or counterfactual, 
no-tax-no-benefit distributions. Fiscal systems evolve in response to the existing underlying 
distributions of assets and hence to existing pre-fisc distributions. The “transplant and compare” 
methodology offers a benchmark scenario for international (and indeed intertemporal) comparisons, 
but to be fully effective, it requires that one country’s distribution of income can be “imaged” onto 
another’s, by a transformation which is linear in logarithms. If the log-linear transformation fails to be 
effective, we can still examine “net” redistributive impacts after both countries’ pre-fisc distributions 
are made to look the same, although there may be a base-dependency issue – which can be tested for 
and possibly rejected. In the final section of the paper we discuss this and other remaining problems.  
2. The relationship between redistribution and original inquality 
in existing literature  
2.1 Empirical and theoretical investigations  
Wagstaff et al. (1999) is a comprehensive analysis of redistributional effects and tax progressivity 
effects of the personal income tax for twelve OECD countries. They find that there is no link between 
pre-tax income inequality and the degree of redistribution brought about by the personal income tax. 
For example, Ireland, Spain, the UK and the US are the countries with the most unequal pre-tax 
income distributions, and are found to be more redistributive than many other countries, but less 
redistributive than Sweden and Finland, which have very low levels of pre-tax income inequality. 
 
Intuitively one might expect that the countries with the highest pre-tax income inequality are the most 
redistributive, simply because the potential for redistribution is highest. The median-voter model 
(Romer, 1975; Roberts, 1977; Meltzer and Richard, 1981) provides a theoretical framework within 
which such a relationship could be manifested. For subsequent work in this line, see Alesina and 
Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), Perotti (1996) and Milanovic (2000). However, it is 
often claimed that redistribution from rich to poor is least present when and where it seems most 
needed; a finding that Lindert (2004) calls “the Robin Hood paradox”. Bassett et al. (1999) find some 
empirical support for this. See also Bénabou (2000) and Moene and Wallerstein (2001). In Milanovic 
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(2010), econometric issues and problems are highlighted which may have contributed to the mixed 
results in the literature. 
 
Other investigations include: that of Alesina and Angeletos (2005), who suggest that differences in 
redistributional efforts reflect differences between societies’ social perceptions regarding the fairness 
of market outcomes; that of Lambert et al. (2003), according to which different attitudes to what are 
socially acceptable levels of inequality in different countries can account for differing redistributional 
policies; and that of Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002), who suggest that low income countries will restrain 
both the size of government and the progressivity with which the size is financed.  
2.2 Approaches to the measurement of redistribution 
Links between outcome measures of inequality and of redistribution differ for different definitions of 
redistribution. A central strand of the measurement literature, initiated by Kakwani (1977), defines 
Gini-based summary progressivity measures which contain a contribution from the pre-tax income 
distribution and a contribution from either the distribution of the tax burden or the distribution of post-
tax income. In either case, overall progressivity results from the interrelationship between taxes and 
the pre-tax income distribution, a characteristic which from a public policy point of view makes tax 
progressivity measurement often more interesting than pure inequality measurement: it establishes 
relationships between initial conditions (pre-tax income distributions), policy tools (taxes) and 
outcomes (post-tax income distributions).  
 
Progressivity is measured by redistributive effect if there is a contribution from the distribution of 
post-tax income, and by disproportionality if there is a contribution from the distribution of the tax 
burden. Kakwani (1977), who showed that the link between his disproportionality measure and 
Reynolds and Smolensky’s (1977) redistributive effect measure is conditioned by tax level. 
Bourguignon and Morrison (1980) proved that the Reynolds-Smolensky index is the only conventional 
measure of redistributive effect which is determined jointly by tax level and the inequality impact of 
an identically-distributed one dollar tax. Aronson et al.’s (1994) decomposition of the Reynolds-
Smolensky index shows how to isolate vertical, horizontal and reranking contributions from this 
measure, and has recently been refined (Urban and Lambert, 2008). Going back in time, Musgrave and 
Thin (1948) and Pechman and Okner (1974) offered precursor measures to the Reynolds-Smolensky 
index which can (now) be seen as normalizations of the achieved inequality reduction, in which the 
normalization is by the equality or inequality level prevailing before the tax was applied. Fellman et 
al.’s (1999) “optimal yardstick” approach measures the redistributive property of an in-place income 
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tax relative to the redistribution that could have been achieved had the tax been designed to have 
maximal inequality impact given the tax level. This approach uses the extended Gini coefficient of 
Yitzhaki (1983), providing the analyst with an opportunity to input a distributional judgment 
parameter, which conditions the results.  
 
An important non-Gini strand of the progressivity literature uses the welfare-function-based Atkinson 
(1970) index of inequality, for a chosen degree of inequality aversion, to quantify redistributive effect. 
The Blackorby and Donaldson (1984) and Kiefer (1985) progressivity indices each adopt this 
approach, which, like that of Fellman et al., requires an assumption about the degree of inequality 
aversion of the social observer. The Blackorby and Donaldson index measures the proportion of after-
tax income the social observer would hypothetically pay to convert a flat tax system with the same 
yield into the given one. When pre-tax inequality is low, the observer will pay less in order to avoid a 
proportional tax. Therefore, when such a measure is used as an indicator of the degree of tax 
progressivity, we can expect smaller redistributive effects in countries which are more equal before 
tax.1  
 
All of these approaches result in progressivity measures which conflate tax system differences with 
pre-tax distributional differences. When used to make cross-country comparisons of redistributive 
effect, this tangled, twofold informational content prevents pre-tax inequality and what we might call 
“redistributional  effort” from being explored as distinct phenomena. In Dardanoni and Lambert 
(2002) a methodology is proposed which fixes this problem, rendering common-base estimators for 
cross-country comparisons of redistribution. Post-tax income distributions are adjusted on the basis of 
differences between the pre-tax distributions they are derived from by controlling for location and 
spread differences. By eliminating all other pre-tax income inequality differences, for whatever reason 
they happened (behavioral incentive differences or demographic variations, for instance), we get 
closer to identifying the effect of tax policies or “redistributional ambitions” across countries. 
Redistributional properties are measured and compared (using any or all of the conventional 
methodologies) for the “transplanted” income distributions, now for a common baseline. Comparisons 
after such transplantation are guaranteed invariant to the choice of baseline if candidate distributions 
are isoelastic transformations of one another (i.e. if the pre-tax income distributions only differ in 
                                                     
1  Lambert and Thoresen (2009) found, when applying the Blackorby-Donaldson index, that the Norwegian tax 
system is not very redistributive. Duclos and Lambert (2000) contains evidence of much higher values for 
Canada. 
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logarithms by location and scale, thus not exhibiting major shape dissimilarities). This is the approach 
we shall follow in the remainder of the paper.2 
 
Progressivity measurement can be extended to the benefits flowing from government expenditure 
programs, if these are attributed to individuals or households in cash-equivalent terms, and to a 
combined tax and benefit system. See Kim and Lambert (2009) and also Fellman et al. (1999) for 
extensions of Gini-based measures to a combined tax and benefit system, and Duclos and Lambert 
(2000) in respect of the Atkinson-index-based measures. Horizontal and reranking effects are also 
considered in these papers. In an Appendix, we provide some technical details about the measures of 
redistribution used in this study, and about implementation of the transplant and compare procedure. 
3. Data and definitions 
Information about redistributional effects of the personal income tax across countries are computed 
from the LIS database (http://www.lisproject.org), which provides a high-quality source of 
internationally comparable data on household incomes. The selection of countries has been restricted 
by availability of information about pre-tax income distributions and the need for information across 
countries from approximately the same time period. This leaves us with data from 14 countries in the 
time period 1999-2001 (Australia (AUS), Canada (CAN), Denmark (DNK), Finland (FIN), Germany 
(DEU), Israel (ISR), Netherlands (NLD), Norway (NOR), Poland (POL), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland 
(CHE), Taiwan (TWN), United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US)) and information about 1 
country from 1997, Belgium (BEL). We have utilized estimates of summary measures across countries 
provided by LIS, but mainly we have employed information from the LIS data by submitting SAS-
programmes to the micro data bases of the respective countries, obtaining tailor-made measures.3 
 
The sizes of the datasets vary, from observations on more than 80,000 Danish households to about 
3,600 households for Switzerland. For all datasets, income and tax variables are measured in 
“equivalent values”, which means that the nominal values have been weighted by an equivalence scale 
(the square root of number of household members). The representation of each household when 
obtaining summary measures of inequality is in terms of the number of household members; this is 
often characterized as employing the individual as the unit of analysis. 
                                                     
2 In a series of transplant-and-compare exercises undertaken for the Norwegian income tax system over the  
period 1992-2004, Lambert and Thoresen (2009) reported that the transplant-and-compare procedure yielded 
“cogent and seemingly robust results, which are also intuitively satisfying”. 
3  In particular for the “transplant and compare” method it has been crucial to have access to micro data for each 
country. 
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Following from our focus on effects of both tax and transfer policies, we discuss constellations for 
both the tax and expenditure side of governments’ interventions with respect to one pre-tax/transfer 
definition of income, corresponding to what Milanovic (2000) characterizes as factor P income: 
income (including pensions) before tax and social transfers, where the latter includes social insurance 
transfers and social assistance transfers (see http://www.lisproject.org/techdoc.htm for further details). 
Countries’ initial conditions are determined by pre-tax/transfer (pre-fisc) income inequality, and the 
different measures of redistribution are obtained by use of the relevant income variables. For instance, 
estimates of tax redistributional effects are derived by inputting the inequality of gross income 
(including taxed and non-taxed transfers) and the inequality of post-tax income. In the scatterplots that 
are used to describe links, we use measures of pre-tax/transfer income inequality to define countries’ 
places in the international pre-intervention hierarchy.     
 
In some of the constellations information from LIS is combined with information from OECD, who 
for instance have produced measures of the “social inclination” of the expenditure side of the budgets; 
such measures are presented and utilized in OECD (2004, 2005, 2008). 
4. Relationships between pre-fisc income inequality, redistribu-
tion and government size  
4.1 Findings using standard approaches 
As a first step in our explorations, we refrained from using the transplant and compare procedure, in 
order to derive unadjusted findings in respect of the six (Gini and Atkinson index based) redistribution 
measures defined for income taxes in the Appendix, as well as two measures of vertical effect, and 
four that characterize the expenditure side of the budget. We also explored relationships between 
redistribution and some appropriate measures of the size of government. Detailed graphical analysis 
for these scenarios, using scattergrams and fitted regression lines to facilitate identifying relationships, 
can be found in Lambert et al. (2010), the main features of which we describe here before applying the 
transplant and compare procedure which takes into account, rather than neglecting, the differing pre-
tax/transfer inequality experiences in the different countries (namely, by eliminating them).  
 
We found that redistribution increases with pre-tax/transfer income inequality across countries for all 
six measures of income tax redistribution. Each measure produced a surprisingly similar “story”, given 
their different designs, although the Pechman-Okner measure, which normalizes redistribution by pre-
tax inequality behaves slightly differently in some respects than indices embodying other forms of 
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normalization, and displays a weaker relationship with pre-tax/transfer inequality. For instance, the 
three Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden) are less redistributive than the US 
according to the latter group of measures, whereas results for the Pechman-Okner measure indicate 
that redistribution is higher in the Nordic countries than in the US.  We also examined two measures 
of vertical redistribution, and again saw clear positive links with pre-tax income inequality, similar in 
form and substance to those for overall redistribution (suggesting that differences between countries 
according to horizontal effects are limited).4 As for links between redistribution and what we might 
call the size of the government, we tried three measures of size: the share of total income taken in 
personal income tax, the share of GDP accounted for by total tax revenue, (including corporate taxes, 
indirect taxation, etc), and total government outlays (consolidations of accounts for the central, state, 
and local governments plus social security) as a share in GDP. The two latter measures are based on 
data from OECD (2004) for the years 2000 and 2001. The relationships we found were weak, coming 
close to exhibiting negative correlation.  
 
Many authors associate redistribution with features of the expenditure side of the budget. We also 
examined relationships between pre-tax/transfer income inequality and redistribution characteristics of 
the expenditure using our unadjusted data (i.e. without applying the transplant and compare 
technique). The “social inclination” of a country’s government might be measured by transfer 
redistributional effects and the progressivity of cash benefits, along with “size” or “scale” measures 
such as the share in GDP of social expenditures (cash benefits and benefits in-kind with one or more 
social goals) and public cash benefits as a share of disposable income (the former for 2001 in terms of 
available data, and the latter for the mid-1990s). Our findings indicate that in countries with high pre-
tax/transfer inequality, transfers have larger offsetting effects, but the relationship for the progressivity 
of cash benefits is very weak across the board. In contrast, the scale measures are negatively related to 
pre-fisc income inequality. These findings using unadjusted data indicate that there is no relationship 
between how much is used for social support and the progressivity of what is used (which is 
independent of size). We found, indeed, that the UK and Australia are at the low end in terms of shares 
of social expenditures and cash benefits, but both countries are among the most transfer 
redistributional and have high, large and negative transfer progressivities. This may well illustrate the 
trade-off between low-income targeting and the size of redistributive budgets (universalism), as 
emphasized by e.g. Korpi and Palme (1998). 
 
                                                     
4 However, from a tax policy perspective, it can of course be very important to distinguish between horizontal 
and vertical effects. 
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When interpreting these results we need to keep in mind that differences between countries’ pre-
tax/transfer inequality experiences have not been allowed for, and other cross-country differences may 
also be at work. A high value of social expenditures as share of GDP may reflect a high level of the 
social welfare system, but if the beneficiaries have to pay taxes on these benefits, social expenditures 
net of taxes as a share of GDP may be at the same level as in countries with lower social expenditures 
relative to GDP.  
4.2 Findings using the transplant and compare procedure 
It was evident from using unadjusted data, as in the previous section, that conclusions flowing from 
empirical work vary somewhat according to different measures of redistribution adopted. Thus there is 
no clear answer to a question such as “which country is most redistributive?” According to our reading 
of the redistribution hypothesis and other conjectures of the link between pre-tax inequality and 
redistribution, the most relevant measure(s) of redistribution would come from using a methodology 
that provides result in terms of a common baseline: one would like to see how countries’ 
redistributional efforts would compare if computed for (hypothetically) the same level of pre-tax 
income inequality. Therefore we redid all of our analyses using the “transplant and compare” method.5  
 
The transplant and compare method necessitates adjusting post-tax income values by a fitted 
deformation function, whose parameter estimates are obtained by OLS regression, as explained in the 
Appendix. A useful precursor to the comparisons is to validate the base independence of results. Do 
results depend on the choice of reference distribution, i.e. on whether the pre-tax income distribution 
of (for instance) the US or Norway is employed as the base? In Figure 1, we show how one measure of 
redistribution compares for five selected countries, using each of those five countries as the reference 
pre-tax income distribution in turn. The figure shows strong similarities between descriptions of 
redistributional effects for different bases.  
                                                     
5 The conflation of pre-tax income distributions with tax redistributional effects has led authors in the past to 
search for evidence according to a common base to come closer to identifying policy-makers’ efforts to 
redistribute income; see particularly Kasten et al. (1994) and Thoresen (2004) for discussions of over time 
developments in tax progressivity and redistribution, employing tax simulation models to simulate effects of 
tax schedules for different years on the same pre-tax income distribution. 
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Figure 1.  Redistributional effects (Reynolds-Smolensky index) of the personal income tax ac-
cording to the transplant and compare procedure for different reference distribu-
tions. Results for Germany, Canada, Norway, the UK, and the US. 
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Clearly there is not a serious issue of base dependence, and we elect to work using Norway as 
reference distribution. Is there a relationship between common-base redistribution and pre-tax/transfer 
income inequality across countries? See Figure 2, in which redistribution for a reference level of pre-
tax income inequality is measured on the vertical axis and pre-tax/transfer income inequality is 
measured on the horizontal axis (by the Gini coefficient in two cases, and the Atkinson index in one 
case). In this scenario, results would not be expected to depend on whether a redistribution index with 
or without normalization with respect to pre-tax inequality were used, since the effect of differences in 
pre-tax income inequality levels are now controlled for directly. We show specimen results for three 
measures of overall redistribution and two measures of vertical redistribution. The overall 
redistribution measures are those of Reynolds-Smolensky and Kiefer (which are not normalized), and 
the Fellman et al. measure, which is normalized with respect to the socially optimal inequality-
reducing yardstick tax. See the Appendix for formal definitions of these. For vertical effects, we use 
the measures devised by Kakwani and Urban-Lambert.  
 
In Figure 2, common-base tax redistribution and pre-tax income inequality are plotted together. The 
figure includes fitted linear relations with upward slopes, but as reflected by the t-value (in 
parentheses), the identification of these relationships is weak in three of the charts – those for the 
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Reynolds-Smolensky index and the two measures of vertical effects - whereas the links for the Kiefer 
index and the Fellman et al. measure are clearly positive. Of course, it is somewhat “heroic” to carry 
out regressions with such a limited number of data points, but it provides a helpful way to summarize 
the empirical links.6  
 
These results signify that the choice of index for redistribution is important. Also, relationships 
between countries’ common-base redistributional efforts for the personal income tax and their pre-tax 
income inequality levels are weaker now than were perceived when using standard approaches. The 
reason is that the deformations reduce the redistributional effects in countries with high pre-tax income 
inequality, as the non-equiproportionate compression reduces pre-tax income differentials more than 
the post-tax income differentials. Thus, the standard procedure may suggest that high pre-tax income 
inequality countries, such as the US, deliver more redistribution than is actually true for an empirical 
strategy that seeks to identify cross-country “redistributional efforts”. The positive relationship for the 
Fellman et al. measure is particularly interesting because this measure captures redistributional effort 
relative to an optimal design of taxes, suggesting perhaps that countries with high inequality succeed 
in taxing people more closely to the relevant optimum. According to the two measures of vertical 
redistribution, the US, Sweden and Norway are about equally redistributive, which means that the 
vertical “redistributive efforts” are about on the same level in these three countries.  
 
We also tested the transplant and compare procedure for the combined effect of taxes and transfers, 
which means that deformations are carried out for an income concept before taxes and transfers 
(which is similar to the income concept of the horizontal axes in Figure 2). The reliability of results of 
the common base measurement method depends on being able to characterize pre-policy income 
distributions (across countries) by a two-parameter deformation function (see the Appendix). As it 
turns out, the income distributions before both taxes and transfers are more difficult to align, and so 
we refrain from presenting results of these comparisons here. We have no ground, therefore, for 
confirming or negating the indications we found using unadjusted data. 
 
                                                     
6 Another complicating factor is that measures for each country are prone to statistical uncertainty. Standard errors can be 
approximated by bootstrapping procedures, along the lines described by Lambert and Thoresen (2009, p.231).  
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Figure 2.  Common-base tax redistributional and tax vertical effects vs pre-fisc income inequa-
lity  
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Fellman et al. index
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Urban-Lambert vertical effect
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We end this section by examining if there is a trade-off between common-base redistribution and size of 
government on the financing side of public budgets. Figure 3 describes the relationship between 
common base redistribution and total tax revenues as share of GDP; for the latter, data are obtained from 
OECD (2004). We see no indication of countries trading off redistribution; rather the contrary: countries 
with a large public sector appear to put in more redistributive efforts too.7 Of course, such trade-offs may 
still pertain for the expenditure side of budgets, as suggested by Korpi and Palme (1998).    
Figure 3.  Relationship between (common base) tax redistribution and tax revenue share  
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5.  Overview and ways forward 
The understanding of the development of fiscal policies in response to pre-fiscal distributions of 
income is an intriguing but very challenging question. One major problem is that policies and income 
distributions evolve over time in close interrelation to each other, suggesting that they are endogenous 
in a cross-country perspective. Nevertheless, the relationship attracts substantial attention, not the least 
from a political economy perspective: does inequality create a political demand for redistribution 
(redistribution hypothesis) or do we observe a “Robin Hood paradox”?     
 
The literature offers mixed results. Given the data we used for this study, for 15 countries from the LIS 
database, we see a rather clear picture concerning the conflicting results on the relationship between 
pre-tax/transfer income inequality and redistribution. When each income tax system is evaluated 
                                                     
7 We see a similar pattern when letting the average personal income tax be plotted against common base redistribution. 
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according to its own pre-tax/transfer inequality baseline, personal taxes appear to be more 
redistributive in more unequal countries, even though results to some extent depend on the choice of 
index. Similarly, we also see indications that transfers are more targeted in countries with high pre-
tax/transfer income inequality. However, relationships between measures of size of government and 
redistribution, although very weak, come closer to exhibiting negative correlation.  
 
Our results, indicating that the relationship between redistributional effort and pre-tax inequality is 
weaker than suggested when using standard measures, have been obtained despite some open 
questions about issues of significance, from both economic and statistical points of view. When the 
log-linear transformation required for the transplant and compare procedure fails to be effective, we 
can still examine redistributive impacts after both countries’ pre-fisc distributions are made to look the 
same, either reporting failure if nothing is transparent (as we did here for expenditure progressivity), 
or, where results are suggestive, reporting as a rider that there may be a base-dependency issue. Ours 
was a “pilot study” only. The issue of robustness, i.e. of the “reach” of the transplant-and-compare 
technique, clearly will bear further examination.  
 
The contrasting evidence presented here and from past studies clearly invites confusion around such 
questions as “which country is the most redistributive?”. We believe that what many authors actually 
have in mind, when discussing the relationship between income inequality and redistribution across 
countries, is the concept of redistributional effort for (hypothetically) the same level of pre-tax income 
inequality. For the redistribution hypothesis and other conjectures of the link between pre-tax 
inequality and redistribution, certainly, the most relevant measure(s) of redistribution would be 
common-base measures – those of the Dardanoni and Lambert (2002) variety, which come from 
applying the “transplant and compare” methodology to raw tax and income data. 
 
The cross-country tax redistributive effects of personal income taxes are functions of the measurement 
system adopted, which has until now been the traditional one, in which the existing pre-tax inequality 
values for the various countries inevitably condition the results and confound comparative work. The 
results of using the “transplant and compare” procedure, as in this study, show weaker relationships 
for tax redistributional and vertical effects than results according to traditional methods. Thus, the 
common-base evidence presented here suggests that there may well be no link between pre-
tax/transfer income inequality and redistributional effects of the personal income tax, in a cross-
country perspective. In that sense the present approach supports neither the redistribution hypothesis 
nor the “Robin Hood paradox” depiction of the relationship.   
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Technical appendix  
1.  Indices of progressivity used in Section 4 
Let x be individual or household pre-tax income, let n be post-tax income and let the aggregates of 
these across the population be X and N. Denote the Gini coefficient for an attribute u = u(x) by GU, and 
denote the Atkinson inequality index with parameter e by IU(e). Principally, we shall encounter GX and 
GN and IX(e) and IN(e) in what follows. The concentration coefficient for u when income units are 
ranked by x will be denoted CU. We shall encounter CN and CT here, where t = x - n is the individual 
tax payment and T is the total tax. Let the total tax ratio (or overall average tax rate) be g = T/X. The 
factor (1 )
g
g  is often called tax level: it measures total taxes relative to the total remaining (post-
tax) income. This notation, along with all of what follows, is exactly as in Kim and Lambert (2009). 
 
We first enumerate the Gini-based measures that will feature in our empirical investigations. The 
Reynolds-Smolensky (1977) index of redistributive effect is RE = GX – GN  and the Kakwani (1977) 
index of disproportionality is PK = CT – GX = [(1-g)/g]VK where VK = [GX – CN ] quantifies the 
“vertical” redistributive characteristic of the income tax, namely, its inequality-reducing impact on 
average, from which additional terms need netting out in order to obtain RE. A negative “horizontal” 
contribution arises in case there is unequal tax treatment of pre-tax equals (introducing inequality 
where there was none before). Kakwani did not allow for this feature of a typical tax system in his 
1977 paper, but in his 1984 paper he introduced the decomposition RE = VK – RK, where RK = GN – CN 
is an index of the reranking which occurs when income units which were better-off than others before 
tax end up worse-off, because of differential tax treatments. In Urban and Lambert (2008) it is shown 
how to properly adapt this decomposition when, as is common, there is a sparsity or complete lack of 
exact pre-tax equals in one’s data. The final decomposition is of the form RE = VUL – H - RK, where H 
is a term measuring the effect of the unequal treatment of exact equals, which is effectively netted out 
of Kakwani’s VK; his reranking measure stands. An algorithm for computing VUL (or H) is given in 
Urban and Lambert (2008).8 
 
The earlier Gini-based indices of redistributive effect are those of Musgrave and Thin, 
1
1
MT N
X
GRE
G
  , and Pechman and Okner,  
PO X N
X
G GRE
G
 . The “optimal yardstick” version, due 
                                                     
8 H may be negative if there are few or no exact pre-tax equals in the sample: H is an estimate only, and can be 
an underestimate.  
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to Fellman et al., takes the form 
0
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
F X N
X
G GRE
G G
   
   where ( )XG   and ( )NG   are extended 
Gini coefficients with parameter  1  , and 0 ( )G   is the (counterfactual) post-tax Gini which would 
pertain if the same tax revenue were raised by a 100% tax on all income above a certain pre-tax 
threshold, with no tax lower down the distribution.9  
  The Blackorby-Donaldson (1984) index of redistributive effect is 
( ) ( )
1 ( )
BD X N
X
I e I eRE
I e
   and the Kiefer index is ( ) ( )
KI
X NRE I e I e  .  
 The last of these (the Kiefer index), as well as the first (Reynolds-Smolensky) measures 
redistributive effect as inequality reduction, without normalization. The others normalize either by pre-
tax inequality (REPO) or by pre-tax equality (REMT, REBD). All can be applied to a benefit system or net 
tax and benefit system, simply by re-interpreting N as respectively income including benefits or 
income including benefits and net of tax.  
 
2. The transplant and compare procedure 
Let F(x) be the distribution function for pre-tax income in a given country, and, as before, let u = u(x) 
be some attribute of a person or household having x before tax.  If g(x) is a mapping of pre-tax 
incomes into \ , the conjugate mapping 1 ( ) ( ( ( )))gu x g u g x , i.e. 1 gu g u g  D D , operates on 
the distribution 1F gD . If an isoelastic function g(x) can be found such that 1F gD  equals a chosen 
reference distribution – e.g. the standard lognormal distribution, call this LN(0,1),10  although for our 
empirics we chose to put the income distribution of Norway in this role, see on - then as Dardanoni 
and Lambert (2002) have shown, the conjugate of the pre-tax/post-tax income mapping x n  can be 
regarded as the transplant of the tax system into LN(0,1) . This can be done with the data of each 
country, to enable a set of comparisons, of the actions of transplanted tax and benefit systems upon 
LN(0,1), in which actual schedules have all been adjusted for pre-tax distributional differences.  
The lognormal is not required for this “transplant and compare” procedure. A key result of Dardanoni 
and Lambert (2002) is that base-independent results are guaranteed, i.e. it does not influence results 
whether the pre-tax income distribution of Norway or some other country is used as base instead of 
LN(0,1), provided that the deformation function is isoelastic. Thus whenever within-country pre-tax 
                                                     
9 In practice, we used an iteration procedure to find the pre-tax threshold which divides the population into two: 
those who pay no tax and those who are taxed 100 percent on income above the threshold; see also footnote 6 in 
Fellman et al. (1999). 
10  That is to say, y  LN(0,1)  ln(y)  N(0,1), where N(0,1) is the standard normal distribution.  
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income distributions differ in logarithms only by location and scale, any appropriate “reference” 
distribution can be selected, and the comparisons made with tax systems that have been adjusted for 
international differences in pre-tax location and scale.   
 
Empirically, one wants to find that, for each country i, there exist ai and bi > 0 such that the 
distribution of ln( )i ia b x  is sufficiently close to the chosen reference distribution, where x is pre-tax 
income. Thus, the method implies finding estimates of ai and bi that minimize the differences between 
the two distributions in terms of location and scale. This corresponds to finding the intercept and slope 
in a traditional OLS regression, and the 2R  statistic becomes the relevant measure of goodness-of-fit. 
The post-tax income values are then adjusted by the fitted deformation function ( )i i i
a bg x e x before 
making comparisons of progressivity and redistributive effect. 
 
Before carrying out the regressions some data trimming was done. First of all, to remove effects of 
outliers, all records with negative or zero income were dropped. Then the datasets were bottom-coded 
at 1 percent of mean pre-tax income and top-coded at 50 times the median; see Brandolini and 
Smeeding (2007) for similar (but not identical) data manipulations of LIS data. Next, the datasets were 
adjusted to the same sample size;11 we used sizes of 5,000 observations and 10,000 observations, 
dependent on the samples in question. In the procedures to derive Norway-adjusted estimates of 
redistribution, we added in an error term, which was drawn from a normal distribution. This and 
additional practical issues concerning implementation of the “transplant and compare” method are 
discussed in Lambert and Thoresen (2009). 
 
The results of the 14 OLS regressions that were used to establish the common-base results can be 
found in Lambert et al. (2010). The slope estimates are above or below 1 dependent on whether the 
respective pre-tax income distributions are more equal ( 1b  ) or more unequal ( 1b  ) than the pre-
tax income distribution of Norway, involving either expansion ( 1b  ) or contraction ( 1b  ) in the 
transformation to replicate the Norwegian distribution. The last column shows how well the regression 
estimates in combination with data from the respective countries were able to reproduce the pre-tax 
income distribution of Norway, in terms of pre-tax inequality estimates. The largest deviation was 
observed for the regression against Switzerland (CHE), which overshoots pre-tax income inequality by 
6.4 percent. In the calculation of the common-base redistributional effects, see Figure 2, we employed 
                                                     
11 See footnote 23 in Dardanoni and Lambert (2002), where the necessity to equalize sample sizes is discussed. 
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the deformation functions for both the pre-tax and post-tax income distributions; we could have 
instead used the actual value for pre-tax income inequality for Norway.12  
                                                     
12 This issue is extensively discussed in Appendix C in Lambert and Thoresen (2009). 
